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【Abstract】
This paper examines the welfare impacts of non-farm entrepreneurship in rural Vietnam using
the quasi-experimental approach. After introducing the theoretical framework of diŠerence-in-
diŠerences (propensity score) matching, we employ several matching algorithms in the empirical
analysis. We identify that engaging in the nonfarm entrepreneur is welfare enhancing, at least in
terms of per-capita food expenditure and per-capita income. Our empirical results estimate that the
magnitude of per-capita food expenditure impact is from 13.6 to 16.2 for the nominal term and
from 14 to 17 for the real term. Meanwhile, the magnitude of per-capita income is from 21 to
28 for the nominal term and from 19.4 to 26.5 for the real term. However, non-farm
entrepreneurship has insigniˆcant welfare impacts with regard to per-capita Lunar New Year ex-
penditure and per-capita durable assets. We conclude that there is a room for welfare improvement
in rural Vietnam through entrepreneurship on which the government policy should focus. We also
discuss social constraints that the government policy must overcome to promote non-farm en-
trepreneurship in rural Vietnam.
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1. Introduction
Leaving the agricultural sector and engaging more in the non-farm sector are becoming an im-
portant trend in rural Vietnam. According to the General Statistics O‹ce of Vietnam (GSO, 2007,
2012, 2018), from 2001 to 2016, the number of rural households increased by 22.34 from 13.03
million to 15.98 million but the number of agriculture households reduced 18.45 from 10.57 mil-
lion to 8.62 million (or from 81 to 54 of total rural households). In 2016, about 7.37 million
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equivalent to 46 of Vietnamese rural household mainly worked in non-farm sectors. In terms of
income sources, the agricultural production used to be the main source for 78.5 of rural house-
holds in 2001, but in 2016, this ˆgure reduced to 47.9. Meanwhile, around 44.2 of rural house-
holds had their main income from the non-farm sector. In terms of labor, of total 31.02 million in the
workforce in rural Vietnam in July 2016, 14.21 million (or 45.8) were working in the non-farm
sector.
The rural non-farm sector includes all non-farm activities generating income to rural households
either through waged work or in self-employment (Davis, 2004). Among these activities, non-farm
entrepreneur is increasingly becoming an important component. By deˆnition, a rural non-farm en-
trepreneur is a type of non-farm activities that requires a rural household to invest capital, manage
the business, manufacture non-farm products or deliver service without any wage or salary. The in-
come scheme from non-farm entrepreneur activities is the net proˆt of the business, re‰ecting the
balance between cost and revenue, considering the loss-making risk. In poor countries, on average
20 of the rural poor households engages in non-farm entrepreneurs, ranging from 7 in Udaipur,
India to 50 in Ecuador (Banerjee and Du‰o, 2011). In Do (2018)'s sample of 2,956 Vietnamese
rural households, there were 14 of them engaging in a non-farm entrepreneur.
Why do rural households engage in a non-farm entrepreneur? A classical answer is that the non-
farm entrepreneurial activity is so productive in terms of income-generation that rural households
naturally choose to run their own business for proˆt-seeking purpose. Indeed, Yunus (1999) and
other microˆnance supporters believe that the poor themselves are ``natural entrepreneurs'' due to
the way they manage to survive with various ˆnancial constraints. Hence, everything they need is a
ˆnancial ``nudge'' to run their own entrepreneur, and welfare gain will soon come. However, to
some researchers, engaging in non-farm entrepreneur does not naturally have welfare impact.
From their point of view, running such a business is poorly a way to ``buy a job'' when a more tradi-
tional job opportunity is not available. For example, Banerjee and Du‰o (2011) argued that even
though the marginal proˆts of the non-farm entrepreneurs were high, most of them experienced
loss or very low proˆtability on average. In a ˆeld study, they found that the entire stock of a gener-
al store in a village in Rural Karnataka (India) consisted of largely empty plastic jars. During two
hours of observing, there were only two customers purchasing a single cigarette, and a few sticks of
incense. They concluded that giving rural households a loan to start a new business does not lead to
a drastic improvement in welfare.
Taking these contrast viewpoints into account, the objective of this paper is to examine the wel-
fare impact of non-farm entrepreneurship in rural Vietnam empirically. The main research ques-
tions of this paper are the following: (1) in rural Vietnam, whether non-farm entrepreneurship is
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welfare enhancing? And (2) if this is the case, to what extent the welfare impact is.
This paper uses the quasi-experiment framework of impact evaluation, namely diŠerence-in-
diŠerences (propensity score) matching. In this framework, the binary decision of running a non-
farm entrepreneur is considered as a (quasi-)treatment in a ``quasi-experiment'' with unknown as-
signment rules. Using propensity score estimated from observable covariates as the probability to
be assigned to the treatment, we construct the counterfactual –the ˆctional non-participants. The
welfare diŠerence between the participants and one's counterfactual is solely the welfare impact of
the decision to run non-farm entrepreneurs.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section is the literature review. The third sec-
tion provides theoretical and empirical frameworks. The empirical results are presented in the
fourth section. The ˆfth and last section is the conclusion, discussion, and further research.
2. Literature review
While both the rise of the rural non-farm economy and the role of entrepreneurship have been
discussed widely in the economic literature, the rural non-farm entrepreneurship and its welfare im-
pact have been much less mentioned. First, this section reviews the discussion on the diŠerent
types of the non-farm entrepreneur in the rural and its welfare implications. We then summarize
the main empirical approaches used to estimate the welfare impact.
2.1. Heterogeneous entrepreneurs: opportunity versus necessity
Entrepreneurs are a heterogeneous group, including the world of street-food vendors and the
world of creators of a high-tech start-up; the world of opportunity entrepreneurs who voluntarily
engage in business to pursue business opportunities and the world of necessity entrepreneurs, who
are pushed into business due to the lack of employment alternatives (Fossen and Buttner, 2013). In
the rural economy settings, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD]
(2015) discussed three type of non-farm entrepreneurship: ``entrepreneurship by choice'', ``en-
trepreneurship by necessity'' and entrepreneurship for ``risk management''. Some rural house-
holds, usually with more productive endowments, might actively choose to diversify their economic
activities to non-farm, higher return, and higher entry barrier markets for maximizing their poten-
tial and future returns. These households work with the entrepreneurial spirit: taking the higher
risk for higher proˆt. They belong to ``entrepreneurship by choice''. In contrast, ``entrepreneurship
by necessity'' describes rural households with disadvantageous endowments. These households
ˆnd it di‹cult to maintain their survival by solely specializing in the farming sector, so they must
engage in a non-farm entrepreneur that is often in a low entry barrier market. In this case, nonfarm
entrepreneurs emerge due to an absence of other employment opportunities and a shortage of both
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savings and investible capital (Haggblade et al., 2010). Last but not least, entrepreneurship for
``risk management'' refers to the fact that in many locations, especially in remote areas, agriculture
production signiˆcantly suŠers from uncertainty. As a result, rural households with low-risk prefer-
ence see the non-farm entrepreneur as a self-insurance strategy against agriculture risks for the
purpose of vulnerability-reduction and income smoothing.
Given the heterogeneous nature and the domination type of entrepreneurs in the rural, the wel-
fare impact of non-farm entrepreneurship is ambiguous and needs to be examined empirically. For
example, Nagler and Naud áe (2017) estimated a discrete choice probit model of running a non-farm
entrepreneur for Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, and Tanzania. Their results implied that in
these African countries, there were both cases of ``opportunity entrepreneurs'' and ``necessity
entrepreneurs''. However, necessity entrepreneur is dominant in the rural. As a result, non-farm
entrepreneurs should be viewed as secondary, seasonal activities and some forms of insurance in
time of economic necessity, rather than an important income source. Referring to the discussion in
the introduction section, in the eye of Banerjee and Du‰o (2011), rural non-farm entrepreneurs
were mainly the necessity one, while in the eye of Yunus (1999), the entrepreneurs were mainly
the opportunity one.
2.2. Empirical strategies in estimating the welfare impact
Estimating the welfare impact is to examine what happened to the household's welfare indicators
due to solely the decision to engage in non-farm entrepreneurs. The welfare impact is the diŠerence
in potential outcomes with and without such decision. Unfortunately, one of these two potential out-
comes is unobservable. Namely, for the household running a non-farm entrepreneur, the potential
outcomes when she did not run such an entrepreneur is unobservable, and vice versa. Because the
households with and without a non-farm entrepreneur are diŠerent in their nature, the average out-
come diŠerence between them is a poor welfare impact estimation which suŠered from selection
bias. Eliminating the selection bias is the main objective of most empirical economic research (Ger-
tler et al., 2016, p. 59).
The traditional strategy to estimate the welfare impact is regression analysis. In this strategy,
the binary variable of participation is included in the model of the outcome. The estimated
coe‹cient of this variable (or its interaction) re‰ects the welfare impact of participation on the out-
come. The major weakness of this strategy is the functional-form dependence. Furthermore, results
from regression analysis imply correlation instead of causality. Any causal eŠect interpretation
should be explicitly accompanied by solidly theoretical foundations. As a typical example, Kinghan
and Newman (2017) estimate the welfare impact using ˆxed-eŠect models for the case of Vietnam.
They reported that the transition out of specialized agriculture had positive welfare impact. Com-
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1 The most related experiment is the on-going ``Targeting the Hard-Core'' program in India which was primari-
ly reported in Banerjee et al. (2011).
pared to purely agricultural households, the welfare impact is between 17 and 20 per-capita
consumption for the households running a non-farm entrepreneur.
The ``gold standard'' for eliminating the selection bias is a random assignment design. Under
this experimental approach, rural households are randomly assigned to an intervention such as
``facilitating non-farm entrepreneurship''. When the assignment is random, the probability of run-
ning an entrepreneur (treatment exposure) is independent of any outcomes. When both treatment
group (households running an entrepreneur) and control group (households not running an en-
trepreneur) are drawn from an underlying population, random assignment assures that on average
these groups are approximately similar in all dimensions. The diŠerence in average outcomes of the
treatment group and the control group is the welfare impact. Unfortunately, random assignment
design suŠers from several disadvantages, such as high implementing costs (money and time), and
requirement of good knowledge about the assignment rules, which are often missed if researchers
do not engage in the experiment from the beginning (Khandker et al., 2010). To our best knowl-
edge, until now there is no random assignment design for directly estimating the impact of rural
entrepreneurship yet1.
Another strategy that has been increasingly interested in the recent two decades is to mimic ran-
domization in a quasi-experimental design using the matching method (Angrist and Pischke,
2009). This method identiˆes a ``matched group'' of households without non-farm entrepreneur
that looks ``most similar'' to the treatment group (households with non-farm entrepreneur). As a
result, their welfare diŠerence implies the welfare impact. Under certain assumptions, the observa-
ble outcome distribution of the matched group can be substituted for the unobservable counterfac-
tual outcome distribution of the treatment group (Smith and Todd, 2005), and the estimation from
matching and from random assignment must be the same (Heckman et al., 1997). Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) proposed to use the propensity score matching instead of the exact matching to over-
come the ``curse of dimensionality'': conditional on observed characteristics, matching on the
propensity score is as good as matching on observed characteristics. For example, Alemu and Ade-
sina (2017) examined the case of Ethiopia using propensity score matching. They reported that the
non-farm entrepreneurship had a per-capita income impact of 56.
For the case of rural Vietnam –to our best knowledge– except for Kinghan and Newman (2017)
with regression analysis, there is no empirical study of which the purpose is to estimate the welfare
impact of non-farm entrepreneurship. Our paper is the ˆrst one achieving that purpose using a
quasi-experimental approach, namely diŠerence-in-diŠerences (propensity score) matching. The
―  ―
2 The conditional mean independence assumption: E(Y0i|Di＝1, Xi)＝E(Y0i|Di＝0, Xi)＝E(Y0i|Xi)
3 The common support assumption: Pi＝E(Di|Xi)＜1
4 The propensity score theorem: If E(Di|Y0i, Xi)＝E(Di|Xi) then E(Di|Y0, Pi)＝E(Di|Pi)
most related study to ours is Nguyen et al. (2011), in which the diŠerence-in-diŠerences (propensi-
ty score) matching method was carried out to estimate the welfare impact of migration –another
type of nonfarm diversiˆcation– in the rural. The analytical framework of such a quasi-experimen-
tal approach will be discussed in the next section.
3. Analytical framework
3.1. Theoretical framework
This section brie‰y discusses the theoretical framework of diŠerence-in-diŠerence propensity
score matching. Under the quasi-experiment setting, the welfare impact is deˆned as the average
treatment eŠect on the treated (denoted as t): t＝E(Y1i|Di＝1)－E(Y0i|Di＝1)＝E(Y1i－Y0i|Di＝
1). Y1i and Y0i are respectively potential outcomes when the household i runs (Di＝1) or does not
run (Di＝0) a non-farm entrepreneur; E() represents the expected value, E(Y1i|Di＝1) is the ob-
served mean outcome of the treated with treatment, E(Y0i|Di＝1) is the unobserved mean outcome
of the treated without treatment. E‹cient t estimation from matching requires the conditional
mean independence assumption2, and the common support assumption3 must be satisˆed.
Let Pi denote the propensity score for the participant i, conditional on the covariates Xi: Pi≡E(Di
|Xi)＝; let I1 and I0 respectively denote the sets of all households with and without a non-farm
entrepreneur; SP denotes the region of common support; N1 and N0 respectively denote the number
of all households in S1＝I1∩SP and S0＝I0∩SP. Denote C(Pi) the set of neighbors to the participant
i∈S1, in which if j∈S0 and Pj∈C(Pi), then the ``neighbor'' j is matched to the participant i. Using
the propensity score theorem4, the treatment eŠect t is transformed to simply the mean diŠerence
in outcomes over the common support, weighted by the distribution of propensity score of partici-
pants:
t＝E(Y1i－Y0i|Di＝1)＝ E(Y1i|Di＝1)－E(Y0i|Di＝1)＝E(Y1i|Di＝1)－EPi|Di＝1[E(Y0i|Di＝1,Pi)]
＝E(Y1i|Di＝1, Pi)－EPi|Di＝1[E(Y0i|Di＝1, Pi)]＝
1
N1
∑i∈S1Y1i－
1
N1
∑i∈S1 ÂE(Y01|Di＝1, Pi)
＝
1
N1
∑i∈S1[Y1i－ ÂE(Y01|Di＝1, Pi)]＝
1
N1
∑i∈S1[Y1i－∑j∈S0Y0j.v(i, j)]
In a 2-period setting of t0 and t1, the ˆrst diŠerences DY1i＝Yt11i－Yt01i and DY0i＝Yt10i－Yt00i can be
used as outcomes, then t＝
1
N1
∑i∈S1 [DY1i－ ÂE(DY0i|Di＝1, Pi)]＝
1
N1
∑i∈S1[DY1i－∑j∈S0DY0j.v(i, j)]
The term ÂE(DY0i|Di＝1, Pi) needs to be estimated for each participant i using their matched
``neighbors'' non-participants. In greedy matching algorithms, we can employ 1-to-1 or 1-to-n
matching by setting up a condition for each candidate j belonging to C(Pi). For example, with
―  ―
Figure 1: The empirical framework
Source: Author's
nearest neighbor(s) matching, we choose j to minimize the absolute diŠerence of propensity score:
C(Pi)＝min
j
∥Pi－Pj∥, j∈I0; with caliper and radius matching, we pre-select a caliper e and deˆne
C(Pi)＝{Pj|∥Pi－Pj∥＜e, j∈I0} then every participant within the caliper e is matched. In kernel
matching algorithms, we match each participant in the treatment group to all non-participants with
a weight so that for each participant, higher weight is given to a ``closer'', more proximal non-par-
ticipant in terms of the propensity score. In this way, the match of the participant i is constructed as
a weighted average outcome of nonparticipants with the weight function v(i, j) depending on the
distance between Pi and Pj.
3.2. Empirical strategy
We illustrate our empirical strategy using the quasi-experiment of diŠerence-in-diŠerences
propensity score matching framework in Figure 1. Firstly, we deˆne a rural household as running a
non-farm entrepreneur if the head of the household reportedly engages in this business. Basing on
the 2012 baseline data, we estimate the propensity score (the probability) of running a non-farm
entrepreneur in 2014 for each rural household by a logit/probit model using maximum likelihood
estimation method. The dependent variable is the binary variable, equal to 1 if the head of house-
hold engages in nonfarm entrepreneur activity. All the covariates are based on a baseline data of
2012. The covariates in the logit/probit model are chosen basing on the literature as well as the
framework in Figure 1 to re‰ect the household's characteristics and the household's endowments.
The generalized linear model of the household i's propensity score Pi has the form: Yi'＝F(Pi)＝b0
＋b1. Characi＋b2. Ki＋b3. Landi＋b4. Li＋b5. HCi＋b6. SCi＋ei (1)
Where: Characi is the vector of the household i's characteristics; Ki is the vector of the proxies
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5 The empirical analysis is performed in Stata 15.1, using Stata's teŠects command (version 1.0.1), the user-
written psmatch2 command (version 4.0.12) by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) and the user-written kmatch com-
mand (version 1.0.6) by Jann (2017).
for capital endowment of the household i; Landi is the vector of the proxies for land endowment of
the household i; Li is the vector of the proxy for labor endowment of the household i; HCi is the vec-
tor of the proxies for human capital endowment of the household i; SCi is the vector of the proxies
for social capital endowment; and ei is the error term. F() is the link function, linking the in-
terested variable Pi with the estimated dependent variable Yi' from the estimated linear equation.
In the logit model, F(Pi)＝ ln



Pi
1－Pi



where ln() is a natural logarithm function. In the probit
model, F(Pi)＝F－1(Pi) where F－1 () is the inverse function of the cumulative standard normal
distribution function F() of which F(Pi)＝
1
2p
∫Pi0 e－x
2/2 dx.
Secondly, the propensity score is used to match the participant and non-participant(s) based on
the algorithms of nearest neighbors matching, radius matching, and kernel matching. As a rule of
thumbs, in the nearest neighbors matching we choose to match each participant with 5 neighbors
from the pool of nearest non-participants in terms of the propensity score. In radius matching, we
choose the caliper ＝.25 sPS, where sPS is the standard deviation of the propensity score estimated
in the previous step, as recommended in Guo and Fraser (2015). In kernel matching, we use the
empirical weight function v(i, j)＝
G



Pj－Pi
h



∑k∈S0G



Pk－Pi
h



where h is a bandwidth (or smoothing
parameter), G() is a kernel function. In this study we choose the ``optimal'' bandwidth h to
minimize the mean integrated squared error; we examine eight kernel function forms:
Epanechnikov, Biweight, Uniform, Triweight, Triangle, Cosine, Parzen, and Tricube. After the
matching in the propensity score, the welfare impact is the diŠerence in the ˆrst diŠerence of well-
being indicators between treatment group and counterfactual control group.
Thirdly, we test the signiˆcant level of the outcome of nearest-neighbors matching (using
Abadie-Imbens standard error) and radius matching and kernel matching (using bootstrapped stan-
dard error with 1000 times of replicates). Finally, balancing test and sensitivity analysis are per-
formed (reported in Appendix 1). The empirical analysis is presented in the next section5.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Data
This paper explores the comprehensive dataset Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey
(VARHS) 2012 and 2014 for rural Vietnam. The survey was implemented in 12 provinces of Viet-
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6 We would like to thank Dr. Tran Cong Thang, the Vice Director-General and Mr. Vu Huy Phuc, the resear-
cher of Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development for giving us access to the
VARHS dataset.
Table 1: Summary of well-being indicators in rural Vietnam in 2012 and 2014
2012 Mean 2014 Mean DiŠerence D
Per-capita food expenditure ('000 VND, 4 weeks) 375.66 376.10 －0.4 －0.18
Per-capita food expenditure (CPI adjusted) 290.15 260.27 －29.9 －10.3
Per-capita income ('000 VND, 1 year) 19,618 24,356 4,738 24.15
Per-capita income (CPI adjusted) 15,153 16,855 1,702 11.23
Per-capita Lunar New Year expenditure ('000 VND) 897 1,015 118 13.2
Per-capita Lunar New Year expenditure (CPI adjusted) 692 702 9.8 1.42
Per-capita durable assets ('000 VND) 8,585 11,036 2,451 28.56
Per capita durable assets (CPI adjusted) 6,631 7,637 1,007 15.18
Number of observations 2,600 2,600
Note: p＜0.001, p＜0.01, p＜0.05, †p＜0.1
Source: Author's sampling from VARHS 2014
nam by the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), the Institute of Labor Science
and Social AŠairs (ILSSA) and the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural De-
velopment (IPSARD) with the co-support of the University of Copenhagen and United Nations
University6. After ˆltered, our dataset includes information of 2,600 rural households in 2-periods
of time, making 5,200 observations.
As commented by SchaŠner (2014, p. 28), examining the welfare impact is challenging because
we cannot directly measure well-being, and ``[the] best we can do is make educated guesses about
well-being eŠects by examining what happens to indicators of well-being, which are imperfect
measures or correlates of well-being''. Also recommended by SchaŠner (2014, p. 28–31), we focus
on three types of ``summary measure'': per-capita consumption, per-capita income, and per-capita
asset. In particular, given the availability of our data, we examine the welfare impact through four
well-being indicators: (1) per capita food expenditure, (2) per capita income, (3) per capita Lunar
New Year expenditure and (4) per capita durable assets. Besides the nominal terms (or the mone-
tary values) of these indicators, we also examine the real terms (in‰ation-adjusted) to eliminate the
impact of in‰ation between 2012 and 2014 using consumer price index (CPI) adjustment. The CPI
in 2010 is set to 100. The CPI in 2012 is 129.468 and the CPI in 2014 is 144.503 (World Bank's
World Development Indicators). Table 1 reports a summary of the well-being indicators in 2012
and 2014. The mean of per-capita income presents the statistically signiˆcant increase of 24.15 in
nominal term and 11.23 in real term. Nominal per-capita Lunar New Year expenditure also shows
the statistically signiˆcant increase of 13.2 in mean value. However, in real term, the change of
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Table 2: Well-being indicators in 2014: with and without the nonfarm entrepreneur
Without
entrepreneur
With
entrepreneur
DiŠerence
(t-test) D
Per-capita food expenditure ('000 VND, 4 weeks) 355 504 149 41.97
Per-capita food expenditure (CPI adjusted) 245.6 348.7 103.1 41.97
Per-capita income ('000 VND, 1 year) 22,007 38,562 16,555 75.23
Income per capita (CPI adjusted) 15,229 26,686 11,457 75.23
Per-capita Lunar New Year expenditure ('000 VND) 967 1,303 336 34.74
Per-capita Lunar New Year expenditure (CPI adjusted) 669 902 233 34.74
Per-capita durable assets ('000 VND) 9,928 17,736 7808† 78.65†
Per capita durable assets (CPI adjusted) 6,870 12,274 5404† 78.65†
Numbers of observations 2,231 369
Note: p＜0.001, p＜0.01, p＜0.05, †p＜0.1
Source: Author's sampling from VARHS 2014
7 Inverse hyperbolic sine function: IHS(x)＝arcsine(x)＝ln(x＋ x2＋1). See more detail in Appendix 2
1.42 in the per-capita expenditure for Lunar New Year between two periods is not statistically
diŠerent from zero. All other well-being indicators do not statistically change from 2012 to 2014.
In our 2014 sample set, 369 or 14.2 rural households run a non-farm entrepreneur. Table 2 con-
sistently reports that a household with a non-farm entrepreneur enjoys a statistically higher level of
well-being in terms of most indicators, compared with its counterparts, except for the per-capita
Lunar New Year expenditure in real term.
For the household's characteristics (Characi), we include the size of the household (the number
of household's member), the dummy variable Kinh ethic, equals to 1 if the ethnicity of the head is
Kinh, and the dummy variable gender of the head, equals to 1 if the head is male. For the capital
endowment of the household (Ki), we use total value of the durable assets in logarithm form as a
proxy. For the land endowment (Landi), we include three types of land for production: owning and
using land, renting and borrowing land, lending and leasing land. Because there are many zero-
values, instead of the traditional logarithm transformation, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation7. We also consider the endowment in terms of land for living, and use living area in
the logarithm form m2 as a proxy. For the labor endowment of the household i (Li), we use the
number of working days of all household's members in inverse hyperbolic sine form in the last year.
For the human capital endowment (HCi), we use the age of the head and the dummy variable mili-
tary, equal to one if the head used to serve in the army as proxies for the experience. The head's
education level is used as a proxy for education.
We operationalize the social capital endowment (SCi) in four dimensions: (1) Formal network:
the number of membership connections of the whole family in the 6 main organizations: Communist
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Table 3: Estimating Propensity Score―Logit and Probit models
Covariates
Logit Model Probit Model
OR b b
Size of the household 0.909 －0.095 －0.052
Kinh ethnic 1.416† 0.348† 0.158
Gender of the head 1.087 0.084 0.033
Total durable assets (Log) 1.239 0.214 0.114
Land owning & using (IHS, m2) 0.806 －0.215 －0.125
Land renting/borrowing (IHS, m2) 0.953 －0.048 －0.026
Land lending/leasing (IHS, m2) 1.077 0.074 0.040
Living area (Log, m2) 1.451 0.372 0.213
Working days (IHS, days) 1.581 0.458 0.240
Military status 0.690 －0.371 －0.203
Age of the head 0.987 －0.013 －0.007†
Education of the head 1.035 0.034 0.019
Communist party 0.627 －0.467 －0.248
Youth Union 1.014 0.014 0.015
Women Union 1.359 0.307 0.152
Farmer Union 0.807 －0.214 －0.128
Veteran Union 1.217 0.196 0.104
Old-age Group 0.780† －0.248† －0.126
Number of Weddings 1.008 0.008 0.004
General trust 0.832 －0.184 －0.109
Political link: Household members 0.447 －0.804 －0.431
Political link: Relatives 1.204 0.185 0.101
Political link: Friends 0.933 －0.069 －0.034
Constant 0.002 －6.238 －3.303
Number of observations 2,600 2,600 2,600
McFadden pseudo R2 0.137 0.136
AIC 1880.36 1883.62
BIC 2021.03 2024.34
Note: p＜0.001, p＜0.01, p＜0.05, †p＜0.1
Source: Author's estimation
Party, Youth Union, Women Union, Farmer Union, Veteran Union, and Elderly Group; (2) Infor-
mal network: the number of wedding ceremonies that the household participated in the previous
year; (3) General trust is a dummy variable, equals to 1 if the household agrees that almost every-
one in the commune is honest and trustworthy; (4) Linking social capital as political connections:
are three dummy variables, equal to 1 if the household's members, relatives or friends work in the
government. and ei is the error term.
4.2. Empirical results
Table 3 reports the odds ratios of the logit model, the coe‹cients b of the logit model and the
coe‹cients b of the probit model. Both logit model and probit model provide consistent estimation
in terms of the sign and the signiˆcance level of independent variables. Between the two models,
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8 Let y＝f(X.b) be the model, the link test calculates _hat＝X. Âb and _hatsq＝_hat2; and then reˆt the model
with these two variables. The signiˆcance of _hatsq is the evidence of existing ``link error'', or the evidence
that our model is misspeciˆed.
we prefer the logit model due to the higher McFadden R2, the lower AIC, and the lower BIC.
The speciˆcation error diagnostic for the logit model is performed using the link test8. The
coe‹cient of _hat with z-value＝6.98 is signiˆcant meaning that our model ˆts data well while the
coe‹cient of _hatsq with z-value＝0.89 is insigniˆcant meaning that our model is not misspeciˆed.
The overall goodness-of-ˆt [Pearson x2(2576)＝2656.92, p-value＝0.13＞0.05] and Hosmer and
Lemeshow's goodness-of-ˆt [Hosmer-Lemeshow x2(8)＝6.56, p-value＝0.5851＞0.05] are tested
to conˆrm that the logit model ˆts reasonably well. The multicollinearity using the variance in‰a-
tion factor (VIF) is tested based on the linear regression. All VIF values are between 1.02 and
1.85, signiˆcantly lower than 5, implying that there is no multicollinearity in the model.
As explained in Appendix 2, the logit coe‹cients b of the variables with logarithm transforma-
tion and inverse hyperbolic sine transformation can be explained as the elasticities. For other varia-
bles without such the transformation, it is advised to use odds ratios to interpret the results instead
of probability because the change in the probability depends on the values of the covariates while
the change in the odds is constant. For example, a 1 higher in total durable assets value is as-
sociated with 0.214 higher in the odds of running a non-farm entrepreneur in 2014, while a 1
higher in the area of land owning and using is associated with 0.215 lower in the odds of running
a non-farm entrepreneur in 2014. For the household whose the head used to serve in the army, the
odds ratio is 0.69 implying 31 lower in the odds of running a non-farm entrepreneur in 2014. We
discuss these results of the logit model in the last section.
The estimated welfare impacts are reported in Table 4 (for per-capita food expenditure and per-
capita income) and Table 5 (for per-capita Lunar New Year expenditure and per-capita durable as-
sets), including the results from three types of matching algorithms: diŠerence-in-diŠerence
propensity score matching with 5 nearest-neighbors, diŠerence-in-diŠerence propensity score
matching with radius matching, diŠerence-in-diŠerence kernel matching with optimal bandwidth
and eight typical types of kernel functions. For the comparing purpose, we also include in these ta-
bles the results from other two types of estimations: (1) the propensity score matching without
diŠerence-in-diŠerences for 5 nearest-neighbors and for kernel matching (Epanechnikov function,
optimal bandwidth) to observe how the estimation look like without capturing the impact of the
other time-invariant characteristics, and (2) the diŠerence-in-diŠerences estimation without match-
ing (or two-periods ˆxed eŠect model). Finally, we employ several balancing tests. The results of
balancing tests are reported in Appendix 1 and Appendix 3.
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Table 4: Per capita food expenditure and income
Per-capita food expenditure
impact (t) Per capita income impact (t)
Nominal t D Real t D Nominal t D Real t D
Nearest-neighbors: n＝5 60.49 13.64 42.75 13.97 6674.58 20.93 4330.27 19.37
Radius, caliper＝0.03117 63.39 14.39 44.59 14.66 7784.31 25.29 5120.49 23.74
Kernel, optimal bandwidth
Epanechnikov 69.26 15.93 49.92 16.71 7500.56 24.15 4923.57 22.62
Biweight 68.55 15.75 49.29 16.46 7418.22 23.82 4865.72 22.30
Uniform 70.33 16.22 50.81 17.05 7586.45 24.49 4974.24 22.91
Triweight 68.20 15.65 48.94 16.32 7347.72 23.54 4814.68 22.01
Triangle 69.13 15.90 49.73 16.63 7460.22 23.99 4894.89 22.46
Cosine 68.42 15.71 49.17 16.41 7392.63 23.72 4847.19 22.20
Parzen 68.39 15.70 48.93 16.32 7279.97 23.27 4764.36 21.73
Tricube 68.36 15.69 49.19 16.42 7425.53 23.85 4871.46 22.33
Propensity Score Matching
Nearest-neighbors: n＝5
49.4 10.87 34.18 10.87 10267.23 36.29 7105.20 36.29
Propensity Score Matching
Kernel: Epanechnikov
44.45† 9.67 30.76† 9.67 10823.20 39.02 7489.95 39.02
DID without Matching 45.18 9.85 22.82 7.002 6428.71 20.01 －7629.90 －95.63
Note: 1. p＜0.001, p＜0.01, p＜0.05, †p＜0.1
2. Optimal bandwidth h＝0.00272
3. Bootstrapped standard error for kernel matching and radius matching; optimal bandwidth is auto-
matically calculated using user-written kmatch command; Abadie-Imbens standard error for nearest-
neighbors matching, with the independent and identically distributed assumption.
Source: Author's estimation
Table 4 presents that the welfare impacts of non-farm entrepreneurship in terms of per-capita
food expenditure and per-capita income are positive and statistically signiˆcant, both in nominal
and real terms. The magnitude of per-capita food expenditure impact is from 13.6 to 16.2 for
the nominal terms and from 14 to 17 for the real terms. Compared with diŠerence-in-diŠer-
ences (without matching) method and propensity score matching (without diŠerence-in-diŠer-
ences) method, of which estimations are about 10–11, the estimations from diŠerence-in-diŠer-
ences propensity score matching are modestly larger. Our estimation is close to the result from
17 to 20 per-capita consumption impact in Kinghan and Newman (2017). In terms of the per
capita income, the impact estimations are mostly in the range from 6.7 million Vietnam Dong
(VND–Vietnamese currency) to 7.6 million VND (or from 21 to 24.5) for the nominal term
and from 4.3 million VND to 5.1 million VND (or from 19.4 to 23.8) for the real term, which
are fundamentally smaller than the 75.2 diŠerence under independent t-test reported in Table 2.
While Table 2 reports that there is a statistically signiˆcant diŠerence of 37.4 in nominal per
capita expenditure in Lunar New Year festival between the household with and without non-farm
entrepreneur, Table 5 shows the welfare impact in term of per-capita Lunar New Year expenditure
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Table 5: Welfare impact: Per capita Lunar New Year expenditure and durable assets
Per capita Lunar New Year
expenditure impact (t) Per capita durable assets impact (t)
Nominal D Real D Nominal D Real D
Nearest-neighbors: n＝5 －12.90 －0.98 －19.89 －2.75 947.0171 2.52 290.64 2.425
Radius, caliper＝0.25 sPS 7.19 0.55 －3.82 －0.54 －108.21 －0.28 －442.11 －3.48
Kernel, optimal bandwidth
Epanechnikov －71.53 －5.20 －60.72 －7.96 799.2468 2.12 298.09 2.489
Biweight －76.68 －5.56 －64.72 －8.44 937.9728 2.49 401.84 3.385
Uniform －61.46 －4.50 －53.35 －7.06 735.8666 1.95 242.85 2.019
Triweight －78.27 －5.67 －66.12 －8.60 1,061.48 2.83 492.28 4.178
Triangle －73.74 －5.36 －62.47 －8.17 929.3552 2.47 395.64 3.331
Cosine －77.20 －5.59 －65.19 －8.49 986.4821 2.63 437.51 3.696
Parzen －77.88 －5.64 －66.14 －8.61 1,208.64 3.24 598.26 5.124
Tricube －77.89 －5.64 －65.56 －8.54 899.1291 2.39 373.29 3.137
Propensity Score Matching
Nearest-neighbors: n＝5
123.54 10.47 85.49 13.86 5,485.30 16.58 3795.98 44.78
Propensity Score Matching
Kernel: Epanechnikov
68.08 5.51 47.11 7.19 3,972.42 11.48 2749.02† 28.86
DID without Matching －0.41 －0.03 －28.07 －3.84 －3,103.20 －14.89 －2147.50 －14.9
Note: 1. p＜0.001, p＜0.01, p＜0.05, †p＜0.1
2. Optimal bandwidth h＝0.00272, caliper is chosen as 1/4 the standard deviation of the propensity
score: caliper＝0.25 sPS＝0.03117
3. Bootstrapped standard error for kernel matching and radius matching; optimal bandwidth is auto-
matically calculated using user-written kmatch command; Abadie-Imbens standard error for nearest-
neighbors matching, with the independent and identically distributed assumption
Source: Author's estimation
are mostly negative and statistically insigniˆcant. The magnitude of the impact is also relatively
small (from －5.6 to 0.6) and statistically indiŠerent from zero. This result implies that there is
no impact of non-farm entrepreneurship on per capita Lunar New Year expenditure, both in nomi-
nal and real terms. The higher level of this well-being indicator of the household with a non-farm
entrepreneur is due to the nature of the household, instead of solely due to running the en-
trepreneur itself.
Similarly, we ˆnd no evidence on the welfare impact of non-farm entrepreneurship when using
the asset measure. Table 5 reports a small diŠerence (mostly positive but also negative in the case
of radius matching) and statistically insigniˆcant impact. In brief, the non-farm entrepreneurship
has no welfare impacts with regard to per-capita Lunar New Year expenditure and per-capita dura-
ble assets both in nominal and real terms.
5. Conclusion, discussion, and further research
The main objective of this paper is to examine the welfare impact of non-farm entrepreneurship
―  ―
in rural Vietnam. Using the quasi-experiment framework of diŠerence-in-diŠerences propensity
score matching, we identify that engaging in the non-farm entrepreneur is welfare enhancing, at
least in terms of per-capita food expenditure and per-capita income. Regarding the second research
question, our empirical results estimate that the magnitude of per-capita food expenditure impact is
from 13.6 to 16.2 for the nominal terms and from 14 to 17 for the real terms. Meanwhile,
the magnitude of per-capita income is from 21 to 28 for the nominal term and from 19.4 to
26.5 for the real term. However, the non-farm entrepreneurship has insigniˆcant welfare impacts
with regard to per-capita Lunar New Year expenditure and per-capita durable assets. Running a
non-farm entrepreneur itself does not encourage a rural household to increase her per-capita spend-
ing in either the Lunar New Year festival or durable assets.
The signiˆcant welfare impacts in terms of per-capita income and per-capita food expenditure are
very promising results that the ``new rural policy'' should pay more attention to. Overall, our analy-
sis suggests that the room for income-generation through rural non-farm entrepreneurship remain
signiˆcantly large. Government policies should design more incentives for such entrepreneurship.
While it is not the main objective of this study, several important points from the propensity score
models in Table 3 lead us to some discussion on which the government's policy could focus.
In our estimation, the traditional factors of production (such as labor and assets), and the larger
living area in the baseline have a positive relationship with the odds of running an entrepreneur in
the endline. To be more speciˆc, if traditional resources (endowment) are available or the house-
hold has a more comfortable living area then she would be more likely to participate in the non-farm
entrepreneur. It implies that the opportunity entrepreneurship has a dominating impact in the rural.
The probability of running an entrepreneur seemingly increases with more members of the Women
Union (the odds increase by 36 with one more membership) and a more informal network. These
results are consistent with the survey of literature on the positive impact of ``bridging social capi-
tal'' and the ``strength of weak ties'', such as in Newman et al. (2014). Namely, more interactions
within the non-professional groups facilitate information sharing and innovation, contribute to the
diŠusion and application of new ideas.
However, the odds ratio (and hence the probability of running an entrepreneur) tends to decrease
if (1) the size of the household increases; or (2) the head is older; or (3) the head used to serve in
the military; or (4) the household has more Communist party members, Farmer Union members or
elderly group members; or (5) the household has members work for the government; or (6) the
household is using more land in production (i.e. owning, renting or borrowing). The ˆndings imply
a story of the dark side of rural society. Embeddedness to farming, such as more membership in the
professional group like Farmer Union or more land use (owning, renting or borrowing) would be
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Table 6: Model comparison
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Household's size 0.909 0.907 0.888 0.885 0.938
With grandparents 2.344
With parents 1.584
With small children 1.380†
With adult children 0.682 0.621
Age of the head 0.987 0.988† 0.990 0.994 0.996
McFadden R2 0.1373 0.1376 0.1392 0.1389 0.1396 0.1387
McFadden R2 (adjusted) 0.115 0.114 0.116 0.115 0.116 0.117
AIC 1880.36 1881.56 1878.14 1878.83 1877.33 1875.20
BIC 2021.03 2028.14 2024.72 2025.41 2023.90 2010.06
Note: Not including other independent variables
p＜0.001, p＜0.01, p＜0.05, †p＜0.1
Source: Author's estimation
more inclined to diminish the odds of diversifying to the non-farm entrepreneurial sector. Higher
engaging in politics in terms of having a family member working for the government, serving in the
military in the past or joining the communist party tends to signiˆcantly reduce the odds of diver-
sifying to non-farm entrepreneur. The odds would reduce signiˆcantly by 55, 30, and 37 re-
spectively for each unit increase in these political connections.
Besides, the family structure characteristics such as the age of the head or the household's size
decrease the odds. Because the labor force measured as the number of working days has a positive
correlation with the odds, we postulate that the negative correlation of household's size results from
the multi-generation family structure of the household, instead of solely from the availability of
members. Namely, our hypothesis is that the household with the elder generation ˆnds it more
di‹cult to diversify in the non-farm entrepreneurial sector. If this is the case, the traditional hierar-
chy in rural Vietnam does matter. We explore this hypothesis by including dummy variables: living
with grandparents, living with parents, living with small children (under 18-year-old), living with
adult children (from 18-year-old) in the logit model one by one in Table 6.
It is surprising that the data does not support our hypothesis. First, the odds ratios in the model
with the dummy variable ``living with grandparents'' (Model 2) is not diŠerent from ones in the
original model (Model 1), implying no eŠect from the grandparent generation. Second, the variable
``age of the head'' becomes not statistically signiˆcant and the odds ratio approximately equals to
unity when the dummy variables ``living with parents'', ``living with small children'', ``living with
adult children'' are included in the model (from Model 3 to Model 5). That means when we control
one of these dummy variables, we cannot predict the possibility of running a non-farm entrepreneur
using the age of the head anymore. Third, the odds ratio of the dummy variable ``living with par-
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ents'' is greater than one (1.584) and statistically signiˆcant in Model 3 implying that the house-
hold of which the head is living with his/her parents has the odds of running a non-farm en-
trepreneur 58.4 higher than the household of which the head is not living with the parents. This
result is an evidence to reject our hypothesis. Similarly, the odds ratio of the dummy variable ``liv-
ing with small children'' in Model 4 is greater than one (1.38) and statistically signiˆcant implying
that the household with small children is 38 higher in the odds of running a non-farm en-
trepreneur. These results imply that the head of the household shall have a higher probability to run
a non-farm entrepreneur when there are parents (Model 3) and kids (Model 4) in his/her family.
Finally, when we include the dummy variable ``living with adult children'' in the logit model, the
predictability of both household's size and the head's age on the probability of running a non-farm
entrepreneur disappears: the odds ratios are close to unity and statistically insigniˆcant (Model 5).
Formally, using likelihood-ratio test, we are able to identify which model, the ``full'' model includ-
ing the variables ``household's size'' and ``age'' (Model 5, with the log likelihood lnL0＝
－913.65797) or the ``nest'' model without the variables ``household's size'' and ``age'' (Model 6,
with the log likelihood lnL1＝－914.59983) ˆts the data better. The log likelihood ratio x2 test
statistic (2 degree of freedom) is: x2(2)＝－2(lnL1－lnL0)＝－2(－913.65797－(－914.59983))＝
－1.884, yielding p-value＝0.3899＞0.05. As a result, Model 6 ˆts data better; and when we know
whether the head of the household is living with adult-children or not, the household's size and the
head's age have no predictability of running a non-farm entrepreneur anymore. The household of
which the head is living with adult children has the odds of running a non-farm entrepreneur 37.9
lower than the household of which the head is not. Our ˆndings imply that the government policy
should focus on supporting the adult children who are living with their parents to be able to manage
their own lives independently, so their parents shall be more willing to diversify to non-farm en-
trepreneur sector.
It is important to note that the regression model illustrates the correlation instead of causality.
Any eŠort to explain the coe‹cients or odds ratios of variables as determinants instead of predic-
tion should be viewed carefully. Further research using the mixed method could be carried out to
explore our discussion that engaging in a non-farm entrepreneur is restricted by several social con-
straints. What's more, our quasi-experimental design implicitly assumes that the eŠect of setting up
a new entrepreneur and continuing to run the old entrepreneur have similar impacts. Further
research could separate these types of non-farm entrepreneur decision to understand the role of
sunk cost of establishing a non-farm entrepreneur to the household's welfare. Finally, the diŠeren-
ce-in-diŠerences matching framework cannot deal with the eŠect of time-variant unobservable
characteristics to the assignment rule (or the hidden bias). For example, the sensitivity analysis via
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the Rosenbaum bounds method presented in Appendix 1 (Table A2) reported that if the hidden
bias exists and it aŠects the odds ratio of assignment to treatment or control by about 17 (G is be-
tween 1.16 and 1.18) then it can reverse our conclusion on the positive per capita food expenditure
impact. Although the Rosenbaum bound test only presents the ``worst-case'', further research
should take hidden bias into account. Such further research shall provide better guidelines for the
government's policy in supporting and promoting the welfare impact of non-farm entrepreneurship
in rural Vietnam.
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Table A1: Balancing test of the covariates (Epanechnikov, optimal bandwidth)
Raw Match
Treated Untreated DiŠerence Treated Untreated DiŠerence
Size of the household 4.30894 4.57373 －0.158893 4.30259 4.31358 －0.006592
Kinh ethnic 0.840108 0.640072 0.468139 0.829971 0.828754 0.002848
Gender of the head 0.840108 0.841775 －0.004553 0.84438 0.843206 0.003208
Age of the head 46.8049 50.2273 －0.266776 47.049 46.9302 0.00926
Military status 0.246612 0.277006 －0.069124 0.253602 0.252205 0.003178
Education of the head 8.08943 6.52039 0.448164 7.96542 8.01639 －0.014558
Communist party 0.102981 0.132228 －0.075486 0.106628 0.120502 －0.035809
Youth Union 0.292683 0.25325 0.063338 0.299712 0.272704 0.04338
Women Union 0.864499 0.740923 0.260748 0.850144 0.852683 －0.005358
Farmer Union 0.495935 0.581354 －0.141957 0.51585 0.495789 0.03334
Veteran Union 0.135501 0.141192 －0.015909 0.14121 0.145047 －0.010725
Old-age Group 0.165312 0.303003 －0.254717 0.172911 0.163583 0.017256
Number of Weddings 20.5881 15.6535 0.340986 20.1009 21.377 －0.088181
General trust 0.837398 0.869117 －0.089654 0.84438 0.874591 －0.085391
Political link: Household members 0.04065 0.069924 －0.128269 0.043228 0.055248 －0.052671
Political link: Relatives 0.200542 0.159121 0.107919 0.201729 0.237315 －0.092717
Political link: Friends 0.178862 0.166293 0.033239 0.170029 0.190101 －0.053083
Living area 4.32688 4.17264 0.302109 4.31217 4.28089 0.061264
Land owning & using 8.00349 8.91727 －0.517378 8.11786 8.13874 －0.011825
Land renting/borrowing 1.21187 1.24606 －0.012047 1.2887 1.22433 0.022686
Land lending/leasing 1.77289 0.947979 0.279309 1.53957 1.56756 －0.009477
Total durable assets 10.1738 9.47384 0.487389 10.0875 10.061 0.018438
Working days 6.8759 6.57979 0.330513 6.85306 6.88169 －0.031956
Source: Author's
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Table A2: Sensitivity Analysis via the Rosenbaum bounds method
G P-value
† of per-capita
food expenditure
P-value† of per-capita
real food expenditure
P-value† of per-capita
Income
P-value† of per-capita
Real income
1.00 0.006126 0.002716 0.008727 0.005541
1.02 0.009511 0.004390 0.013302 0.008647
1.04 0.014310 0.006867 0.019658 0.013075
1.06 0.020902 0.010417 0.028221 0.019190
1.08 0.029695 0.015352 0.039426 0.027390
1.10 0.041103 0.022018 0.053690 0.038084
1.12 0.055517 0.030783 0.071385 0.051665
1.14 0.073281 0.042014 0.092801 0.068487
1.16 0.094662 0.056060 0.118123 0.088834
1.18 0.119827 0.073224 0.147410 0.112897
1.20 0.148821 0.093743 0.180578 0.140753
1.22 0.181556 0.117769 0.217398 0.172350
1.24 0.217812 0.145347 0.257505 0.207507
Source: Author's
Appendix 2: Logarithm and Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
(1) Logarithm transformation of x: ln(x).
Consider the model ln(y)＝b0＋b1. ln(x)＋b2X＋e u
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(2) Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of x: IHS(x)＝ln(x＋ x2＋1)u
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Figure A1: Predicted propensity score with and without non-farm entrepreneurs
Source: Author's
Figure A2 Box-plots for raw and matched data
Source: Author's
Figure A3: Kernel density and cumulative distribution plots for raw and balanced data
Source: Author's
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